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Lost in Translation? Corporate Governance, Independent Boards and Blockholder 
Appropriation 
 
ABSTRACT 
Emerging economies are oftentimes characterized by state capitalism, concentrated 
ownership and constrained resources, where firms face underinvestment due to resource 
misappropriation. The adoption of Anglo-American corporate governance practices may 
result in sub-optimal outcomes. We draw on the multiple agency perspective and research on 
cross-national governance to examine how independent directors, as agents with multiple 
roles, might mitigate blockholder appropriation. Using unique panel data from Russian 
publicly traded firms where the government and the business elite are predominant 
blockholders, we find that independent directors in private firms are less effective in 
mitigating blockholder appropriation than in state-owned enterprises. We further investigate 
board independence effects driven by the exposure to three international governance 
boundary conditions, namely Russian Multinational Enterprises, foreign listings of Russian 
firms, and foreign independent directors on Russian boards. Our study focuses on the agents 
that might assuage principal-principal conflicts, explores when ineffective governance can be 
minimized, and contributes to research on how governance practices developed in advanced 
economies get translated in emerging market economies.  
 
Keywords:  
Corporate governance, blockholders, boards, multiple agency perspective, Russia, MNEs, 
foreign directors, cross-listings, SOEs   
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INTRODUCTION 
Blockholders are often accused of extracting private benefits from minority 
shareholders and creditors (Douma et al., 2006) or, as in the case of state-owned enterprises, 
of mismanagement of funds (Kornai, 1986), resulting in “principal-principal agency” 
conflicts characteristic of emerging market economies (EEMM) (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; 
Young et al., 2008). Such misappropriation can take a variety of forms such as appointing 
unqualified executives in affiliate positions, pursuing projects that advance blockholders’ 
private interests, and diverting assets and cash-flows away from publicly listed firms to 
parent firms or unlisted subsidiaries through self-dealing transactions. We follow the 
literature in defining such appropriation of firm wealth as ‘blockholder appropriation’ (Sun 
et al., 2015; Young et al., 2008).  
Blockholder appropriation might not be as feasible when firms are exposed to 
stronger institutional environments. For example, MNCs from emerging markets operating in 
stronger institutional environments might be pressured to adhere to more effective corporate 
governance practices. Thus, Anglo-American governance regimes have promoted the role of 
independent directors to protect shareholders’ interests in general (Dalton et al., 2007; 
Hermalin et al., 1991; Nguyen et al., 2010) and against blockholder self-dealings in particular 
(Linck et al., 2008). In economies with weak institutional environments such as Russia, 
boards have evolved from being a mere façade imported from the West to a potential 
effective instrument for monitoring, and extenuating blockholder abuse. However, we do not 
know what firm-level factors might trigger these independent boards to fulfill the role of 
reining in blockholder appropriation (Iwasaki, 2008; Melkumov, 2009). This is a serious 
omission since the effectiveness of corporate governance practices is contingent on the 
environment in which they are adopted (Aguilera et al., 2016; Oehmichen et al., 2016; Puffer 
et al., 2011; Yoshikawa et al., 2009). Board structures designed to address principal-agent 
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problems in developed economies may be ineffective when applied to weak institutional 
contexts characterized by principal-principal agency conflicts. Moreover, the consequences 
of heterogeneous blockholder interests (Hoskisson et al., 2002) differ in weak institutional 
environments compared to the West, notably creating a multiple agency setting where agents 
have multiple principals in conflict to attend to (Arthurs et al., 2008).   
Accordingly, we examine the role of independent directors as agents of multiple 
blockholders (principals). In addition, independent directors also represent the adoption of a 
foreign legitimate board practice that through monitoring is intended to rein in systemic 
blockholder appropriation. Specifically, we begin by asking whether blockholder 
appropriation of firm wealth is mitigated by the presence of independent directors in a 
constrained and weak institutional environment. We then explore two key governance 
contingencies. First, we examine the effects of internal governance factors, that is, how the 
relationship between presence of independent directors and blockholder appropriation is 
affected by the ownership type of the majority blockholder? And second, we analyze how 
exposure to international governance, and in particular the enabling role of MNCs and 
foreign directors, affects this direct relationship by activating the monitoring role of 
independent directors.  
We focus on Russia, an important transition economy, because it is a particularly 
appropriate setting for testing our arguments. First, Russian corporate governance practices 
contrast sharply with Anglo-American practices, even though company law and corporate 
governance codes have been largely inspired by Anglo-American rule-making. The clash 
between Anglo-American and Russian socioeconomic environments meant that, at least 
initially, when the country became a market economy, Russian companies only partially 
adopted well-established Anglo-American practices. Second, the presence of independent 
directors has increased significantly since the early 2000s, when the concept of independent 
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directors was introduced with the first corporate governance code. In 2005, it was uncommon 
to find independent directors in Russia (Iwasaki, 2008), where firm boards were largely 
dominated by inside directors affiliated with the two types of owners: wealthy private 
individuals or the state. However, by 2015, independent directors on average accounted for 
30% of boards (RID, 2015), a threshold in line with the recommendations of the 2014 
Corporate Governance Code. Yet, scarce research exploring the effectiveness of independent 
directors in Russia is inconclusive, with the majority of studies finding a positive effect of 
independent directors on firm performance, while a minority arguing that independent 
directors do not seem to help improve corporate governance or mitigate the private benefits 
of control (Muravyev, 2017; Muravyev et al., 2014). Finally, the two distinctive blockholders 
in Russia (oligarchs and the state) are quite different from institutional blockholders in 
developed countries as they have exhibited greater control over the firm assets and boards 
(Grosman et al., 2016). Hence, the severity of systematic blockholder appropriation and 
stealing in Russia and the need for stronger boards to tilt the power balance away from 
blockholders make the Russian corporate sector an ideal context to examine how the roles of 
independent directors get shaped by blockholders and the exposure to foreign practices. 
We make the following contributions to the literature. First, we extend the boundary 
conditions of multiple agency perspective by examining multiple demands on agents (Arthurs 
et al., 2008; Bruton et al., 2010) in an institutional context distinct from the Anglo-American 
model. We identify the heterogeneity of owners and acknowledge the presence of the 
principal-principal conflicts that might lead to blockholder appropriation and minority 
shareholders’ expropriation. We turn our attention beyond the principal-principal relation to 
focus on the demands that agents, in our case directors, might get from these heterogeneous 
blockholders, what is referred to as multiple agency conflict. Specifically, we show that the 
effect of independent directors in mitigating blockholder appropriation is contingent on the 
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type of block ownership to which these agents are exposed. To the best of our knowledge, 
there are no prior studies drawing on multiple agency perspective that explain the multiplicity 
of demands on agents in emerging economies as most literature in these markets focuses on 
the multiplicity or duality of principals (Filatotchev et al., 2011; Jiang et al., 2011; Young et 
al., 2008). We respond to the recent call in Aguilera et al. (2016) for future research on the 
effects of firm-level ownership structures on firm behavior and outcomes. 
Second, we investigate how exposure to international corporate governance practices 
might activate the role of independent directors. In particular, we explore three key 
international governance contingencies that might influence how boards behave when the 
firm is a Russian Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), is listed in a foreign stock market, or 
when their independent directors are foreign. In doing so, we also contribute to IB research 
by studying how foreign governance practices might get ‘lost in translation’ unless properly 
activated through internal governance mechanisms (ownership) or when sufficiently exposed 
to international governance pressures (Aguilera et al., 2017; Bell et al., 2014).  
Third, we contribute to contextual research on state capitalism (Grosman et al., 2016; 
Lazzarini, 2015; Megginson, 2017; Musacchio et al., 2015) by extending the emerging 
literature on boards (Muravyev, 2017; Muravyev et al., 2014) to consider the relationship 
with ownership types (Chernykh, 2008; Durnev et al., 2005; Iwasaki et al., 2017). 
Specifically, we offer insights adding to the limited analysis of the effect of independent 
directors on firm performance in Russia (Muravyev et al., 2014; Muravyev, 2017) by 
analyzing the moderating effects of independent directors for different types of firms’ 
exposure to Anglo-American governance practices and firm ownership.  
There are no studies in leading international business journals on corporate 
governance in the ‘new’ Russia, with the exception of a few multi-country studies where the 
focus is not on Russia alone, and one purely conceptual study (Melkumov, 2009). Hence, we 
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think this research is timely and also joins the comparative corporate governance debate on 
how governance practices travel across different institutional environments and the role of 
MNEs in bridging these two governance worlds.  
EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Institutional background 
The initial Law on Joint Stock Companies (JSC), the main legislative act regulating 
corporate governance in early 2000 and the voluntary Corporate Governance Code issued in 
2002 are seen as attempts to integrate an Anglo-American model of governance by 
emphasizing shareholder rights protection (Roberts, 2004). In the early years of transition to a 
market economy, Russian companies were careful to adhere to the letter of the law but in a 
context where the laws themselves were incomplete or imperfect, the intention of the law was 
purposely circumvented, often at the expense of minority shareholders, such as dilution of 
capital, unfair transfer pricing, unlawful transactions with related parties, and outright 
stealing (e.g., Puffer et al. (2003) provide examples of early abuses by blockholders). In 
subsequent years, the introduction of the new Corporate Governance Code in 2014 and the 
eagerness of private blockholders to attract external capital by listing their firms in foreign 
stock exchanges led to gradual integration of host corporate governance practices and 
mitigation of blockholders’ abuses (Muravyev, 2017).  
The adopting of Anglo-American inspired laws and regulations was not without 
challenges in State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). While perhaps less prone to private 
blockholder expropriation (state managers and board directors typically do not own 
substantial share capital), the pyramidal structures of state-owned holding companies, 
originally set up to facilitate the monitoring and management of a large portfolio of firms, 
ended up being cumbersome and not as transparent as privately owned firms. For example, 
Gazprom, a natural gas SOE, was one of the worst firms in terms of corporate governance 
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standards for which the company is heavily penalized in terms of market value (Black, 2001). 
These problems have led to increased government involvement with Putin replacing the CEO 
of Gazprom with his own appointee (Puffer et al., 2003). 
Ownership 
The main corporate governance features in EEMM, and Russia in particular, are high 
ownership concentration and high private benefits of control resulting from weak property 
rights protection and underdeveloped capital markets (Enikolopov et al., 2013). Iwasaki et al. 
(2017) meta-analysis finds that state ownership negatively impacts firm performance in 
Russia, while private ownership is positively associated with firm performance. Behind 
nominee and foreign offshore arrangements there are ultimate controlling owners who are 
either the state or domestic private individuals (Chernykh, 2008). Since the state plays a key 
role in the economy, some independent directors are very strongly associated with the state 
(Megginson, 2017). Candidates are nominated by a government body rather than by 
independent nomination committee. Further, in SOEs, independent directors are obliged to 
follow government directives in voting on many strategic issues (Enikolopov et al., 2013). In 
2008, the government announced that state officials in SOE boards were to be substituted 
with independent directors and professionals, such as attorneys, who would represent their 
interests and minimize conflicts of interest with minority owners (Enikolopov et al., 2013).   
In their cross-country study on corporate governance (which excludes Russia), 
Durnev et al. (2005) highlight the significance of ownership concentration, and conclude that 
having more share capital deters owners from stealing. However, in transitioning Russia, 
quite the opposite applied as the insecurity of property rights resulted in a deterioration of 
corporate governance practices through ownership concentration. Private blockholders sought 
to increase their stakes in other firms by diluting shares of minority shareholders, which they 
achieved by using loopholes in the legal system, and outright theft. Maximizing investments 
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and value of assets through improving corporate governance was at best a secondary issue 
and for private blockholders even undesirable, because it could have limited their ability to 
expropriate (Enikolopov et al., 2013). This situation began to change at the beginning of 
2000s, as the focus of attention started to shift towards increasing market value of the assets 
already owned and as a result, blockholders made significant improvements in corporate 
governance. We address this relationship between ownership and appropriation by 
distinguishing between the types of concentrated blockholders: state and private individuals. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
We develop an organizing framework to examine whether the introduction of Anglo-
American governance practices enhances the effectiveness of corporate governance in 
EEMM. In particular, we explore whether the presence of independent directors attenuates 
the degree of blockholder appropriation (baseline hypothesis), commonly referred to as 
stealing. Next, we analyze how effective independent directors are in deterring blockholder 
appropriation contingent on: (1) internal corporate governance controls, that is, the identity of 
the blockholder they represent, and (2) external corporate governance pressures, that is, the 
firm exposure to Anglo-American practices, which might activate the spirit of their 
independent director role. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Effective corporate governance through independent directors 
While non-executive directors’ independence is a common governance practice, the 
notion and functions of independent directors vary remarkably across different jurisdictions 
(Ferrarini et al., 2014). The most common approach defines independent directors as 
individuals without a business or family relationship with the firm, to prevent conflicts of 
interests with the corporation (Zattoni et al., 2010). Given the different institutional context in 
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EEMM related to the strong role of state in the economy, the Russian governance code has a 
unique additional exclusion – an independent director cannot be a representative of the 
Russian government. Further, after seven years of service on a company board, a director can 
no longer be considered as independent. Moreover, Anglo-American listing rules and codes 
require at least the majority of board seats to be composed by independent directors. The 
composition requirements are less stringent for EEMM, given the relative infancy of 
corporate governance practices. In Russia for instance, the corporate governance code 
recommends at least 25% of total board for independent directors and at least three 
independent directors in absolute numbers.  
The governance literature indicates that directors should have both functional and 
firm specific skills. Independent directors are valuable in providing oversight of a firm’s 
financial practices and may protect shareholder’s interests affecting important board 
outcomes, such as CEO substitution, the reaction to potential takeovers, and top 
management’s compensation (Zattoni et al., 2008). Independent directors offer different 
perspectives from executives on strategic decisions, and this increases the likelihood of 
creative and innovative solutions (Roberts et al., 2005).  
Research on understanding the functions of independent directors in EEMM is rather 
scarce. During the earlier period of transition, independent directors in EEMM were not fully 
fulfilling their roles, largely due to the lack of guidance in the corporate governance code 
(Braendle, 2015). Subsequently, directors were given more rights and power in order to 
signal efforts to improve the governance of EEMM firms and to attract investors. For 
instance, de Haas et al. (2017) analysis of directors appointed by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to companies in which EBRD is a shareholder 
suggested that independent board directors in EEMM assume the roles of monitoring, advice 
and resource provision broadly similar to what one would expect from independent directors 
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in the Anglo-American environment. On this basis of the conventional wisdom of board 
independence as a mechanism to protect minority shareholders against blockholders’ self-
dealings, we propose our baseline hypothesis (H0):  
H0. A higher proportion of independent directors in emerging market firms is likely to 
attenuate the degree of blockholder appropriation.  
Internal corporate governance: Private vs. State Blockholders 
In their monitoring role, independent directors in EEMM are mandated to protect the 
interests of all shareholders. Yet, they might face a principal-principal (PP) agency problem 
between majority and minority shareholders, due to weak minority shareholders’ rights 
protection and directors’ incentives aligning with the most powerful blockholder. PP conflicts 
emerge from differences in principals’ goals and objectives. One of the consequences of not 
effectively managing PP conflicts is blockholder appropriation of real firm resources, 
accomplished through legal or illegal means, resources that would have otherwise been 
reinvested in the firm in the form of fixed investments.  
As independent directors are agents of both majority and minority shareholders, and 
respond to their multiple and often conflicting demands, we adopt a multiple agency 
perspective (MAP) (Allcock et al., 2010; Arthurs et al., 2008; Bruton et al., 2010; Child et al., 
2003; Hoskisson et al., 2013; Hung, 1998). MAP applies to situations in which agents are 
connected to more than one principal. Being connected to more than one principal, 
independent directors as agents have a dual identity. MAP extends agency theory by 
considering the potential tensions an independent director as an agent might encounter as a 
result of this dual identity (Pratt et al., 2000). Unlike traditional agency theory, MAP 
recognizes that principals and their agents could implement actions which are favorable to 
some, but detrimental to other principals (Sarens et al., 2016). We extend MAP by looking at 
how effective independent directors are in tackling blockholder appropriation depending on 
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the identity of the blockholder. The type of blockholder matters because de facto, the 
independent director is selected by the blockholder.   
We analyze two types of blockholders – domestic private wealthy individuals (who 
control private firms) and the state (who control state-affiliated entities or SOEs), as majority 
ownership by financial institutions and foreigners in Russian firms is very rare (Chernykh, 
2008; Iwasaki et al., 2017).  There are several reasons for the appointment of independent 
directors in private firms. First, private firms may be in search of external funds, and 
independent directors might grant access to such funds through their external contacts 
(Hillman et al., 2003) or by increasing the firm’s credibility. Second, independent directors in 
assuming their external roles act as a bridge between competencies and a conduit for 
information flow between the company and its economic and political environments 
(Melkumov, 2009). Third, independent directors’ roles in private firms may also include 
maintaining stakeholder relations. More specifically, in EEMM, serving the interests of even 
distant stakeholders such as media, local authorities, business associations and auditing firms 
has been historically important as EEMM firms still consider operating within the network 
economy as one of the viable ways of doing business (McCarthy et al., 2003; Puffer et al., 
2007). We expect that private blockholders in EEMM appoint independent directors to 
largely fulfil these external roles (Dolgopyatova et al., 2015) and that such appointments help 
blockholders obtain additional resources via legal channels, as well as making blockholders 
more transparent towards the external environment and more accountable towards minority 
shareholders and stakeholders. The multiplicity of independent directors’ roles is reflected in 
independent directors being closely associated with the private blockholder, fulfilling an 
external role of capital provision which would benefit the blockholder to a larger extent, 
while another role is towards minority shareholders by bringing increased transparency 
towards external environment and by attempting to make blockholder stealing less 
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straightforward. Taken together, the presence of independent directors in private domestic 
firms leads to lesser degree of blockholder misappropriation of resources. Therefore, we 
propose,  
H1a. In emerging market firms controlled by domestic private blockholders, independent 
directors are likely to attenuate the degree of blockholder appropriation.  
When it comes to SOEs, the roles of independent directors are harder to disentangle 
than for private firms. Traditionally, SOEs boards were mostly filled with insiders, current or 
former governmental officials in charge with pursuing political or bureaucratic agenda 
(Puffer et al., 2007). However, SOEs progressively became more market and profit-oriented 
and this dynamic change led to a redefinition of board roles with more independent directors 
being appointed.  We argue that when an SOE decides to appoint independent directors to the 
board, the state and managers are seeking a more efficient internal capital allocation, 
resulting from better monitoring, advice or sanctioning from independent directors. The state 
as a shareholder might be looking to diminish the negative effects of soft budgeting.  
However, the independent director, as an agent, will be conflicted to address the interests of 
the state as well as those of minority shareholders which might not always be aligned.  
Although the number of SOEs appointing independent directors has increased, SOEs 
are less enthusiastic about integrating Anglo-American governance practices of advanced 
market economies (RID, 2014). In addition, while some SOEs get listed in foreign markets, it 
is unusual for them to appoint foreign independent directors (Kriukova, 2009). This also 
suggests that the purpose of independent board members in SOEs might be fundamentally 
different from private firms. Thus, we argue that when SOEs appoint local independent 
directors, it is not as symbolic as in private firms.  Independent directors’ roles are less 
related to resource provision but to offering professional or industry expertise, as well as to 
increase monitoring of management and funds allocation. Conversely, foreign independent 
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directors are more likely to be appointed to boards of private firms, where their main function 
is resource provision, networking and enhance credibility towards foreign investors.  
In Russia as in other EEMM, independent directors in SOEs are selected from the 
national register of independent directors and recommended to the board by the state (PwC, 
2013), rather than voted by the independent nominations committee. De facto, an 
independent director appointed to the board of an SOE is the one that the state recommends. 
Further, in SOEs, independent directors are obliged to follow government directives in voting 
on many strategic issues (Enikolopov et al., 2013). In fact, many SOE independent directors 
envisage this board position a possible entry into a career in politics or at least as a way of 
establishing personal political ties with high state officials (Nehaytchuk et al., 2015). Given 
this political goal to progress in the state career ladder, these directors might become more 
recognized for producing efficient financial results during their term relative to the incentives 
of inside directors. In other words, they are viewed favorably by the government if 
contributing to firm efficiency such as by reducing state funds mismanagement. They might 
also be more efficient as civil servants in doing so relative to their counterparts in private 
firms who are subordinated to private blockholders’ will. Thus, board independence 
attenuates the effects of blockholder misappropriation when firms are controlled by the state.  
In sum, in SOEs, independent directors are more professionalized and seem to 
contribute more to overall firm efficiency, while in private firms with blockholders seeking to 
capture rents, independent directors have less control over blockholder appropriation, as they 
are appointed primarily for service provision rather than monitoring. Hence, we propose, 
H1b. In emerging market firms controlled by domestic private blockholders, independent 
directors attenuate less the degree of blockholder appropriation than independent directors 
in SOEs.  
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External corporate governance 
We now turn to what happens when the role of these independent directors is fully 
activated through the exposure of EEMM firms to international corporate governance 
standards. By full activation, we refer to the transition from simply adopting a practice, 
maybe symbolically, to fully enacting or internalizing the practice. In the case of independent 
directors, Aguilera et al. (2017) show for instance that in Japan, companies had adopted 
independent boards for a long time, yet these boards did not pursue monitoring until firms 
had a certain amount of pressure from foreign institutional investors. It was the significant 
exposure to international governance practices that activated their independent role. Below 
we discuss three contingencies that appear in the Russian context: Russian firms that 
internationalize (MNEs), Russian firms that list in foreign markets, and Russian firms that 
invite foreign independent directors to their boards.  
Independent directors in MNEs 
The diffusion of stronger corporate governance practices to weaker regimes may 
occur through the internationalization of firms from EEMM as they equip themselves with 
the necessary corporate governance to compete globally (Aguilera et al., 2017; Sojli et al., 
2017). As EEMM firms expand operationally into North America and Europe, they encounter 
new institutions and get exposed to the often higher levels of governance and transparency of 
host countries. Even though some structural governance conditions are likely to persist such 
as concentrated blockholders, family ownership (Aguilera et al., 2016) and business groups 
(Bhaumik et al., 2016), these EEMM multinationals present in advanced institutional settings 
will have to reconcile their emerging market corporate governance systems and pursue true 
independent directors’ roles and provide greater transparency.  
We expect that EEMM MNEs, through higher exposure to international corporate 
governance practices, bond with the standards of host countries. Their independent directors 
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are also more internationally oriented and encouraged by the blockholders to take on more 
responsibilities in decision making. Studies of US MNEs document that these firms have 
boards with more internationally experienced and younger directors (e.g. Sanders et al., 
1998). Internationalization of a firm’s operations increases the complexity of monitoring due 
to a higher asymmetry of information between the management, the blockholder and the 
board which increases the need for independent directors with the relevant skills for efficient 
monitoring. A higher degree of commercial internationalization is also associated with a 
higher number of independent directors with international experience (Oxelheim et al., 2013). 
In their advisory role, independent directors bring to the board important expertise and 
important network ties, which can lead to better decisions and resource use (Daily et al., 
2003). We expect that a higher proportion of independent directors on the board would 
reduce blockholder appropriation in MNEs.  
H2. A higher proportion of independent directors is likely to attenuate the degree of 
blockholder appropriation in emerging market MNEs. 
Cross-listings and bonding 
The need for access to global capital markets sharpens firms’ incentives for better 
governance (Doidge et al., 2007). Cross-listing allows access to foreign capital which helps 
the firm grow rapidly and without leverage (Pagano et al., 2002). For EEMM firms, financial 
relocation to the developed markets can result in some of the national corporate governance 
standards being replaced by the host country standards (Bell et al., 2014; Coffee Jr, 2002), 
paving the way for greater legitimacy. Their cross-listing might lead to stronger ‘bonding’ 
with the governance standards of a host country (Peng et al., 2014) than in case of 
commercial internationalization of MNEs, as there are specific requirements to fulfil in order 
to cross-list, and partially compensate for weak protection of minority investors in their home 
markets (Coffee Jr, 2002). Cross-listing can also be an important signaling mechanism for 
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firms wanting to change perceptions of their corporate governance levels (Temouri et al., 
2016). With cross-listing, the role of independent directors is more fully activated than with 
MNEs, as there are stricter rules of listing exchanges to abide by. We expect that when a firm 
embeds itself in a stronger institutional environment of the country where it decides to cross-
list, a higher proportion of independent directors is likely to attenuate blockholder 
appropriation.  
H3. A higher proportion of independent directors is likely to attenuate the degree of 
blockholder appropriation in emerging market firms listed on foreign stock exchanges. 
Foreign independent directors 
The inclusion of foreign independent directors, i.e., directors domiciled in foreign 
countries, offers an alternative way that firm’s corporate governance practices of a country 
can change as a result of exposure to the corporate governance practices in other countries 
(Miletkov et al., 2016). Foreign directors appointed to Russian boards are high profile 
professionals the international market and cannot compromise their reputation with 
companies potentially involved in self-dealings and appropriation. While generally such 
foreign independent directors are respected industry specialists (Kriukova, 2009), some other 
appointments were meant to create more impact amongst European political and regulatory 
circles (i.e., Gerhard Schroeder, the former German Chancellor, at TNK-BP and Peter 
Mandelson, a former British Labor Party Politician, at Sistema). Differences between 
governance standards in directors’ country of origin and that of the firm on whose board they 
serve can lead to changes in the firm’s governance in a way that is different from changes 
related to other directors (Miletkov et al., 2016). Appointing foreign independent directors 
originating from developed countries reduces firm’s cost of capital by creating further 
legitimacy with the investment and political community and bonding with higher corporate 
governance norms of directors’ countries of origin. Foreign independent directors are 
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expected to offer valuable international expertise and advice, especially to firms with 
significant foreign operations, dealings with foreign suppliers or plans for overseas expansion 
via acquisitions (Adams et al., 2010). Foreign independent directors are more likely to be 
familiar with US or UK accounting rules, laws and regulations, making it easier for them to 
advise the EEMM firms that are willing to internationalize. Bonding non-operationally and 
non-financially with the norms and practices of a foreign country through the expertise 
provided by a foreign independent director may thus mitigate the “liability of foreignness” in 
capital markets that emerging markets firm can experience (Bell et al., 2012). We expect 
foreign independent directors to provide monitoring of managers and blockholders, and 
advice on how to streamline the operations and resource allocation.   
H4. A higher proportion of foreign independent directors in emerging market firms is likely 
to attenuate the degree of blockholder appropriation.  
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
We use data that tracks financial information on 60 largest liquid Russian listed stocks 
(representing over 2/3 of total market capitalization) from Compustat Global complemented 
by self-collected information from public sources, such as business media Vedomosti, Forbes 
and Kommersant; and web disclosures, on these firms’ major blockholders and board 
characteristics between 2000 and 2010. Our results remain unchanged for a reduced panel 
with three consecutive observations for each firm. When excluding outliers (trimming, 
winsorizing at the 1st and 99th percentiles the key variables), the main results also remain 
unchanged. The studied period covers important changes in the institutional environment 
driven by such exogenous events as the appointment of President Putin in 2000, the 
introduction of the Code of Conduct spelling out governance standards in 2002; and the 2008 
financial crisis.  
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The quality of Russian accounting data has been questioned (Braguinsky et al., 2013; 
Kuznecovs et al., 2012), but an attenuating factor is that the firms are all listed and often dual 
listed on foreign exchanges. Moreover, the accounts for such large companies are mostly 
prepared according to International Accounting Standards (IAS) or US Generally Acceptable 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) and audited by reputable accounting firms.  
Table 1 lists number of observations, mean, median, standard deviations, and 
minimum and maximum values for the most common variables used in the empirical 
specification. Descriptive statistics and correlations are produced for the balanced panel of 
firms (218 observations) with no missing values (the same applies to the tables with results). 
Average annual sales for the sample are €1 billion, average fixed investment amounts to €152 
million and median investment to €408 million. About 75% of the private firms with 
independent directors are part of a group in our sample. The majority of Russian companies 
are either governed by a board of directors with an extremely high proportion of independent 
directors or completely dominated by insiders (Iwasaki, 2008). Our sample reflects this 
proportion, with roughly half of firms’ boards composed by insiders only, and over 30% of 
firms’ boards having a proportion of independent directors between 22% and 62% of the total 
board. 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
 
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND METHODOLOGY 
We begin with the dynamic model of investment that includes measures of the use of 
external finance (Brown et al., 2009b). The specification includes cash flow sensitivities of 
fixed investment to different ownership and board structures. The cash flow sensitivities 
allow us to test for blockholder appropriation and misallocation (soft budget constraints) of 
different owners. This dynamic specification of investment, based on Brown et al. (2009b), is 
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the Q-model. Q-models of investment provide an empirically fruitful framework for the 
analysis of firms’ decisions to invest and are widely used in investment literature (Blundell et 
al., 1992). Tobin’s Q represents the ratio of the market value of a firm's existing shares to the 
replacement cost of the firm's physical assets. If Q is greater than one, additional investment 
in the firm would make sense because the profits generated would exceed the cost of firm's 
assets. If Q is less than one, the firm would be better off selling its assets instead of trying to 
put them to use. The ideal state is where Q is approximately equal to one denoting that the 
firm is in equilibrium. 
We use OLS regressions with firm fixed effects which assist in controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity when this heterogeneity is constant over time. This heterogeneity 
can be removed by taking a first difference which will remove any time invariant components 
of the model. The fixed effect assumption is that the individual–specific effects are correlated 
with the independent variables. Fixed effects models are standard in the investment literature 
(Brown et al., 2009b).  
In addition, we use the GMM estimator developed by Arellano et al. (1995) and 
Blundell et al. (1998), where lagged values of endogenous regressors are used as instruments, 
and which is robust to heteroscedasticity and arbitrary patterns of autocorrelation within 
firms. Similar approaches have been used in a number of other applied studies  (Beck et al., 
2006; Brown et al., 2009b). Lagged dependent variables are valid instruments when they are 
also affected by similar firm-level institutions. As Wintoki et al. (2012) notes: “A key insight 
of the dynamic panel GMM estimator is that if the underlying economic process itself is 
dynamic—in our case, if current corporate governance [here: independent directors ratio] is 
related to past performance [here: investment]—then it may be possible to use some 
combination of variables from the firm’s history as valid instruments for current corporate 
governance to account for simultaneity.” 
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Dependent Variable 
Fixed Investment and blockholder appropriation 
The dependent variable, investment, is the first difference of natural logarithms of 
capital expenditures on long-term fixed assets from cash-flow statements. We include a 
lagged investment term, based on formal models of investment behavior, to account for the 
presence of adjustment costs of investment (Brown et al., 2009b). Data on more refined 
measures of non-redeployable investment, such as R&D expenditures, were unavailable. 
However, in less developed markets, firms tend to have more pressing needs to invest in 
infrastructure and machinery so as to build industrial production capacity (Cimoli et al., 
2009; Inoue et al., 2013) rather than R&D. We thus believe that the extent of fixed asset 
investments is correlated with firms’ orientation toward complex, long-maturity projects, for 
which access to more resources via improved board monitoring can be of particular help. Our 
main construct, blockholder appropriation, is measured by the coefficient between 
investment and internal gross cash-flow discussed below.  
Independent Variables 
Internal gross cash flow: Internal gross cash flow (“GCF”), a proxy for resources, is 
based on standard specification (Brown et al., 2009b) and is the first difference of the 
logarithms of the firm’s GCF at the end of period t-1.  GCF is defined as the sum of net 
income and depreciation and amortization charges. We use the magnitude and sign of the 
coefficient of gross cash-flow to investment to measure the likely degree of blockholder 
appropriation following other well-established studies in agency theory. GCF and its 
variations (Brown et al., 2009a; Fazzari et al., 1988) are used widely in the literature as a 
proxy for the magnitude of private benefits (Adams et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2011; Kabbach 
de Castro et al., 2017; Lehn et al., 1989; Linck et al., 2008; Raheja, 2005), meaning that the 
higher the cash-flow, the higher the potential for the blockholder to expropriate or misuse 
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these funds. High GCF increases the potential for opportunistic behavior by blockholders in 
which blockholder utility maximization prevails over firm value maximization (Bertrand et 
al., 2003; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; Kabbach de Castro et al., 2017). We believe that our 
measure of blockholder appropriation enhances the existing literature because we capture 
how GCF translates into investment in fixed assets and firm long term growth, as opposed to 
being used for other purposes enhancing blockholders’ private wealth. Conversely, a negative 
relation between GCF and fixed investment indicates a possibility of some rent seeking or 
cash bleeding. Higher private benefits of control have been associated with blockholder 
appropriation in previous literature, including emerging economies markets (Barclay et al., 
1989; Dyck et al., 2004; Muravyev et al., 2014). 
Our underlying assumption is that Russian firms need fixed investment – official 
statistics and empirical research show that the Russian asset base is relatively old  (Dzarasov, 
2010) – so that Russian firms are not likely to over-invest in new assets for empire building 
or other self-dealing reasons. This is why we feel quite confident that a negative coefficient 
of gross cash-flow to investment would either capture blockholder appropriation or the 
presence of inefficiencies. Ceteris paribus, if free cash flow does not translate into 
investment, it shows that it is deployed elsewhere (while we control for other sources of 
funds for investment, such as debt and equity). 
Block ownership: Block owners are majority shareholders (>50%). We define three 
types of block owners: state, private individuals, and institutional (foreign) investors. 
Ownership concentration above fifty percent was of prime importance for managing the firm, 
given a legal environment which had weak protection of property rights (Adachi, 2013). 
After accounting for missing data, 73% of observations correspond to firms with majority 
shareholders highlighting the predominant concentrated ownership structure of Russian 
companies. Of this sample, 51% are private firms, 46% are state-controlled and only 3% are 
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majority owned by foreign (institutional) investors. This is in line with existing literature 
(Iwasaki et al., 2017) that finds that ownership by financial institutions and foreigners in 
Russian industrial firms is negligible. Private firms are often structured as pyramids or 
through cross-shareholdings. In these structures, the private blockholder achieves control of 
constituent firms via a chain of ownership relations. We account for ultimate control as 
opposed to immediate ownership, disentangling pyramid structures, cross-holdings and other 
mechanisms that mask the ultimate ownership (similar methodology is used in Chernykh, 
2008). 
Board directors: There are three types of board directors – independent, executive and 
non-executive. Executive board directors are those individuals who are also members of the 
top management team, e.g. CEO or CFO. Executive and non-executive directors are 
collectively categorized as insiders.  
Independent board directors: The Russian Corporate Governance Code specifies that 
JSCs should have at least three independent directors who account for no less than 25% of 
board membership. The presence of independent directors is a requirement for larger 
companies listed on foreign stock exchanges and on the Russian stock exchanges for top-tier 
A1 and A2 quotation lists.  The dummy variable for independent directors takes the value 1 if 
there is at least one independent director and 0 otherwise (in which case they are classified as 
insiders). The variable for proportion of independent directors comprises a ratio of number of 
independent directors to total supervisory board size. Half of the firms in our sample have at 
least one independent director. Although the Russian Corporate Governance Code 
recommends a certain threshold of independent directors as described above, an average 
proportion of independent directors in our sample is much lower, at 13.94%. Firms appoint 
independent directors until the proportion of independent directors on the board reaches a 
certain threshold around 15%-30% of the board (along the recommended level by the 
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corporate governance code), and then the number of independent directors remains constant 
in the following years. Hence the annual growth in the number of independent directors is 
observed mostly for the firms with 0 independent directors, i.e. until they hire 2-3 
independent directors. The same two variables (dummy and proportion) are compiled for 
foreign independent directors. Extant literature  found a lack of consistency by firms in 
interpreting the definition of ‘independent’ and a lack of disclosure of information (Brennan 
et al., 2004). Where the information is unavailable or inconsistent, we classify the directors 
based on the definition detailed in the theoretical framework section. For example, directors 
on SOEs’ boards with current or past government roles as directors, executives, politicians or 
bureaucrats are not considered as independent, in line with the Corporate Governance Code, 
even if the firm discloses them as independent.  
Multinational Enterprises (MNEs): We consider a Russian firm to be an MNE when it 
is not just purely exporting abroad, but has substantial operations in other host countries, 
including CIS countries, such as local operating subsidiaries or standalone firms acquired as 
part of an international expansion strategy. For example, TMK, a global supplier of pipes for 
the oil and gas industry, is an MNE as it has operating subsidiaries in the United States, 
Canada, Romania, Oman, UAE, and Kazakhstan. 30% of firms in our sample qualify as 
MNEs.  
Listing stock exchanges: This dummy variable takes the value of 1 for foreign and 
dual listings and 0 for Russian listings. When they go abroad, Russian firms most often list 
on London Stock Exchange, with a few listed on other European or US stock exchanges.   
Main Control Variables 
Following Bond et al. (1994) we include debt and equity issues to control for alternative 
sources of finance to internal resources and to evaluate the changing role of external finance 
for investment. Debt measures net new long-term firm indebtedness, and is in natural 
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logarithm form. New equity (in natural logarithm) measures net new funds from stock issues. 
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value to total book value of assets and is a proxy for 
investment opportunity or demand for investment.  
RESULTS 
We report the results for hypothesis H0 that looks into the effects of independent 
directors on blockholder appropriation in Table 3. In terms of the interaction between the 
proportion of independent directors and GCF, we find that the estimated coefficient is 
positive and significant in both FE and GMM specifications (b=0.84, p<0.05 in FE and 
b=0.36, p<0.05 in GMM). Further, the overall effect of GCF on investment for firms with a 
higher proportion of independent directors (as measured by the sum of the coefficients on 
GCF and on the interaction between GCF and ID Proportion) is positive and significant (the 
reported Wald test for joint significance of these coefficients is significant at p<0.01 in FE 
and p<0.01 in GMM). Regarding economic significance, an increase in GCF growth by one 
percent increases investment growth among firms with a higher proportion of independent 
directors by approximately 0.70 percent in FE, and an increase of one percent in GCF 
increases investment by 0.32 percent GMM1. These findings support the baseline hypothesis 
H0 that a higher proportion of independent directors is likely to extenuate the degree of 
blockholder appropriation. We plotted the two-way interaction effects in Figure 2. We also 
test for the quadratic effect of independent directors. We find that there is no difference 
between the linear and the quadratic predictions of independent directors’ proportion on 
investment (R2 is 0.1215 for the linear term and R2 of 0. 1222 for the quadratic term). 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 and Figure 2 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
 
                                                          
1 The GCF and Investment variables are in first differences for fixed effects, and in levels for GMM 
specification. 
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We report the results from testing hypotheses H1a and H1b on independent directors 
in firms controlled by private blockholders, and their effectiveness relative to SOEs in Table 
4. We follow Fairchild et al. (2009), Miletkov et al. (2016) and  Reinholt et al. (2011) to 
model the moderation effects. Models (1) to (4) test hypothesis H1a on a sub-sample of 
private firms. Models (1) and (2) show the results for fixed effects, while models (3) and (4) 
show GMM. In models (1) and (4), we introduce Tobin’s Q to control for investment 
opportunities, which reduces the total number of observations. The limited data on Tobin’s Q 
is due to the relative infancy of the Russian stock market with earlier years in the period 
having fewer listed firms.   
The interaction effect of GCF and independent directors on investment for private 
firms is positive and mostly significant in FE (as per model (1): b=2.64, p<0.05) and GMM 
(as per model (3): b=0.86, p<0.1). The direct effect of GCF on investment for private firms is 
negative and insignificant except in model (1) where it is significant at p<0.10, indicating 
some degree of blockholder appropriation. The total effect for private firms with independent 
directors (summing the coefficient of GCF and that of the interaction between GCF and ID 
Proportion) as per model (3) is significant and positive (confirmed by the reported Wald test 
with p<0.05) meaning that for an increase of 1% in GCF, investment would increase by 
0.80%, and as a result, there is less likelihood of blockholder appropriation for private firms 
with independent directors, supporting hypothesis H1a2. We plotted the interaction effect of 
the proportion of independent directors on the relationship between investment and gross-
cash flow (GCF) for the sub-sample of privately owned firms based on the estimated effects 
reported in the results of Table 4 (models (1)-(3)). The higher the ratio of independent 
                                                          
2 Governance may be constrained not merely by shareholders but by bondholders. We have measured the effects 
of bondholders by examining debt ratings by the major ratings agencies.  We were able to collect bond ratings for 
10 firms (17% of total sample). While this is only a small proportion of our sample, we have tested our baseline 
hypothesis in OLS on this sub-sample (unfortunately, the number of firms further drops to 6 as we include all the 
explanatory variables). The results indicate that in economic terms, for firms with public bonds and a proportion 
of independent directors, every 1% increase in cash-flow leads to an increase of 6.84% in investments 
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directors, the higher the impact of GCF on investment for private firms, hence we observe a 
positive slope, as per Figure 3. 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 and Figure 3 about here  
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
We then test hypothesis H1b on the relative effect of independent directors in private firms 
compared to SOEs in models (5)-(8) of Table 4. We use three-way interactions, e.g. 
GCF*blockholder*director, where blockholder is a dummy variable, indicating either state, 
domestic private, or foreign blockholder, and director is a dummy indicating the presence of 
at least one independent director (indep) as 1 and 0 otherwise (insider) 3.    Firms controlled 
by domestic private blockholders with independent directors (GCF*private*indep.) on the 
board represent most privately-owned firms in our sample. Examples of such firms include 
mineral fertilizer Acron, steel making and mining company Evraz, natural juice producer 
Lebedyansky, mining and metals company Mechel, mobile operator MTS, natural gas 
producer Novatek and Sistema, a large conglomerate company, headed by Vladimir 
Yevtushenkov. These firms are generally viewed as progressive in terms of their corporate 
governance practices.  The SOEs with independent directors (GCF*state*indep.) during the 
period of our study are fewer. At state-owned Aeroflot, for example, all three independent 
directors have been nominated by private holders of a blocking stake, which allows them to 
conduct their policies. These independent directors effectively offset the dominant control of 
the government. They are active although it is not clear whether they are capable of 
representing interests of minority shareholders. Like state nominees, they vote together: there 
are practically no disagreements among them. Another recent example of an SOE with 
prominent independent director presence is Rosneft which reappointed Gerhard Schroeder, 
                                                          
3 To avoid comparing the coefficients across different sub-groups of firms and testing the differences in 
coefficients for statistical significance, we have them all in one specification by using the three way interactions. 
Specifications in models (5) to (8) have mutually exclusive and exhaustive dummies on GCF with all the 
possible combinations (6 in total), therefore we do not need to report the direct effect of GCF. 
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the former Chancellor of Germany to the board in 2017 (although during the period of our 
study, Rosneft did not have any independent directors). Mr. Schroeder was entitled to 
$500,000 annual base pay at Rosneft but officially declined it to mitigate criticism from his 
political party SPD and the Chancellor Angela Merkel. His role at Rosneft is to facilitate 
Russo-German relations and investments, since Rosneft has 12% market share in Germany, 
and is investing €600 million in modernization of the assets it owns in Germany (PCK, Miro, 
Bayernoil). In the last seven years, Rosneft supplied Germany with 132,000,000 tons of oil 
for a cost of about €75 billion (Raibman, 2017). This example supports our empirical 
evidence that the presence of high profile independent directors in SOEs can have a big role 
in these SOEs legitimacy building and internationalization. 
Private firms without independent directors (GCF*private*insider) are less transparent, and it 
is harder to get an understanding of their corporate governance practices, since very little is 
publicly disclosed. Representative firms in this category are oil companies Bashneft and 
Slavneft, the retailer GUM, and TMK, a global supplier of a range of pipes for the oil and gas 
industry. Bashneft, one of ten largest oil companies in Russia, was part of Sistema 
conglomerate at the time of our study period, and the board of directors of Bashneft was 
composed entirely by insiders, and it is believed it played a nominal role if not colliding with 
the board of Sistema.  
Finally, SOEs with boards composed by insiders only (GCF*state*insider) are still 
predominant in Russia. Representative SOEs include the diamond mining company Alrosa, 
long-distance telephony provider Rostelekom, banking and financial services company 
Sberbank and many others. Regarding economic significance, model 5 in Table 4 shows that 
the GCF growth in private firms with independent directors has an impact of 0.26%4 on 
                                                          
4 To calculate the total effect of GCF in private firms, we add the two interactions together, GCF*private*indep. 
and GCF*private*insider  
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investment growth, GCF in SOEs with independent directors has a larger impact of 0.44% on 
investment (we test the sum of coefficients being different from 0, and the null hypothesis is 
rejected at p<0.001 significance level).  
To test hypothesis H2 concerning effects of independent directors in MNEs, we use 
the sub-sample of MNEs (Table 5, models (1) and (2)). The moderating effect of independent 
directors’ is positive and significant (b=1.10, p<0.05 in FE and b=1.27, p<0.05 in GMM), 
and the total effect of GCF on investment for MNE firms with a higher proportion of 
independent directors is positive and significant in both FE and GMM (b=0.92 and b=1.09 
respectively), with the Wald test for the sum of coefficients being significant. These findings 
provide consistent support for Hypothesis H2. 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here  
------------------------------------------------------ 
To test hypothesis H3 concerning cross-listing, we examine a sub-sample of foreign-
listed firms (Table 5, model (3) and (4)). The results show that the more independent 
directors a firm appoints, the higher is the positive moderating effect on investment (or 
negative effect on blockholder appropriation), supporting hypothesis H3. The interaction 
between the proportion of independent directors and GCF for foreign-listed firms shows a 
positive and significant coefficient in both FE and GMM specifications (b=2.08, p<0.01 in 
FE and b=1.14, p<0.10 in GMM). Further, the overall effect of GCF on investment for 
foreign-listed firms with a higher proportion of independent directors (measured by the sum 
of the coefficients on GCF and on the interaction between GCF and ID Proportion) is positive 
and significant in FE (the Wald test for joint significance of these coefficients is significant at 
p<0.01 in FE). This indicates complementarity between the two governance mechanisms – 
foreign listing and independence of directors.  
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We test hypothesis H4 of the moderating effect of foreign independent directors’ 
proportion on blockholder appropriation, and find that the appointment of such directors is an 
efficient way of monitoring the allocation of resources to investment (Table 5, models (5) and 
(6)). Regarding the interaction between the proportion of foreign independent directors and 
GCF, we find a positive and significant coefficient in both FE and GMM specifications 
(b=0.82, p<0.01 in FE and b=1.07, p<0.05 in GMM). Further, the overall effect of GCF on 
investment for firms with a higher proportion of independent directors (measured by the sum 
of the coefficients on GCF and on the interaction between GCF and ID Proportion) is positive 
and significant (the Wald test for joint significance of these coefficients is significant at 
p<0.001 in FE and p<0.05 in GMM specification).  
Robustness tests 
We perform a series of robustness tests to confirm the validity of our findings and rule 
out alternative explanations. These findings are not reported in detail here but are available 
on request. First, we acknowledge the complexity of (especially foreign) independent 
directors’ effect on investment with a possibility of board efficiency effect co-existing with 
board signaling and legitimacy effects. The appointment of foreign directors may mitigate 
blockholder appropriation through enhanced monitoring and advice, measured by the 
interaction term between foreign directors and GCF. The signaling effect of this involvement 
is best proxied by the effect foreign directors have on external finance, rather than internally 
generated funds. In unreported specifications, we controlled for the interaction between 
external finance and foreign directors, and the main interaction between GCF and foreign 
directors still remains significant.  
Second, the relevance of corporate governance varies across economic sectors 
depending on the risk of expropriation by the state or systemic corruption.  To address this 
concern, we partitioned our data into firms from ‘strategic’ sectors, where the threat of 
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expropriation by the state is high, and all other firms. These are sectors of ‘strategic’ 
importance to the Russian government, such as energy, oil & gas, precious metals & 
minerals, aerospace & defense, marine ports & services, and broadcasting. Foreign investors 
are generally constrained to purchase shares in these strategic sectors. The unreported results 
show that independent directors are not likely to attenuate blockholder appropriation in 
strategic sector firms. It appears effective corporate governance is less common in strategic 
economic sectors due to the persistence of corruption.  
We have also included industrial sector dummies 5 in specifications with random 
effects. We observe that the automobile sector dummy significantly interacts with GCF and 
ID Proportion. As firm size increases complexity, we control for it with the first difference of 
logarithms of sales. We find that larger companies invest proportionally more. The level of 
GCF also gives us an indication of size (larger firms tend to generate larger amounts of cash-
flows). Overall, we observe that our baseline model produces consistent results for H0 
(independent directors mitigate blockholder appropriation), but this is indeed contingent on 
many different factors, such as belonging to a strategic sector.  
Third, we produced alternative measures of blockholder appropriation. We found that 
independent directors positively impact vertically or horizontally integrated structures, while 
they negatively impact the likelihood of a firm belonging to a business group. We constructed 
a measure for firms that are part of the same ownership structure and vertically integrated 
(binary variable, 1/0). For example, oil and gas companies, such as Bashkirenergo, Bashneft 
and Irkutskenergo are vertically integrated, meaning that they can control access to scarce 
natural resources, from exploration and extraction of crude petroleum to downstream 
refineries and distribution networks.  
                                                          
5 Most firms in our sample are electric utilities, oil & gas, metals & mining, distributors, and food producers 
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We also constructed a measure for firms owned by the same blockholder and 
horizontally integrated (binary variable, 1/0). For example, two businesses are horizontally 
integrated if they are at the same stage of production, such as two supermarkets, or two food 
manufacturers. 
Lastly, we measured the impact of independent directors on business groups (Table 
6). A business group (Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005), sometimes referred to as a conglomerate, 
is a diversified portfolio of unrelated companies belonging to the same holding company 
which is controlled by the ultimate controlling owners (blockholders). Sistema for example, 
is a business group, operating a portfolio of large businesses in the areas of IT, banking, 
retail, and oil & gas, all ultimately belonging to Mr Yevtushenkov, the private blockholder 
(oligarch). We construct a dummy equal to 1 when a firm belongs to a business group and 0 
otherwise. 
Following the literature on business groups in Russia and in other emerging 
economies (Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005; Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan, 2002), we posit 
that in business groups where firms are owned by the same ultimate blockholder and where 
some of the firms are from unrelated business sectors, blockholder appropriation may happen 
to a larger extent than in vertically or horizontally integrated groups. We posit that when 
firms are vertically or horizontally integrated, they have more operational synergies between 
the entities in the group, and also the blockholders have lesser opportunities to use such 
entities to tunnel funds from one entity to the other. We find that independent directors are 
negatively associated with business groups which are more prone to blockholder 
appropriation as per Table 6. In unreported tables, we find that independent directors have no 
effect on vertically and horizontally integrated groups. 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here  
------------------------------------------------------ 
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We also produced a measure of investment efficiency as the deviation of the size of 
the investments from the level predicted by economic conditions. Several studies on Russia 
using externally compiled composite corporate governance indices as measures for good 
corporate governance have uncovered that: 1) board independence is unrelated to corporate 
transparency and disclosure; 2) governance structures have a significant effect on disclosure 
for non-cross-listed firms; and 3) disclosure of financial and operational information has a 
positive effect on firm value (Berezinets et al. (2017); Black et al. (2016).  In line with Biddle 
et al. (2009), we find that reporting quality as measured by Standard & Poor’s financial 
information disclosure score, is positively associated with investment among firms with 
higher likelihood of under-investing. We also uncover that the presence of independent 
directors increases investment regardless of whether a firm is more or less likely to over-
invest. In sum, these alternative measures provide support for our hypotheses that 
independent directors are likely to be efficient and to reduce blockholder appropriation. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Emerging market firms characterized by ownership concentration are exposed to 
principal-principal conflicts, which are exacerbated with weak institutions. This is when 
majority blockholders might extract private benefits of control from minority shareholders 
(Grossman et al., 1988), also referred to as blockholder appropriation. We study the recent 
Russian context where codes of good governance have been adopted and there is eagerness to 
attract foreign capital. The main blockholders are private investors and the state, and there 
has been historic blockholder appropriation (Douma et al., 2006). Russian firms have begun 
to introduce Anglo-American corporate governance practice but traditionally they were 
effectively only symbolic (Pistor et al., 2000).  In this study, we focus on a quintessential 
Anglo-American governance practice, independent directors, who have the role of monitoring 
and advising managers on behalf of all owners, not just blockholders. We propose that these 
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independent directors who have internalized or activated their roles have to act on behalf of 
shareholders/principals with potentially different interests.  
Against this backdrop, and given some efforts in incorporating and internalizing 
Anglo-American practices in EEMM, and in particular in Russia, starting at the turn of the 
century with the adoption of codes of good governance and EEMM firm internationalization, 
we first question whether boards with independent directors have been effective in mitigating 
one of the main governance problems in Russia, i.e., majority blockholder stealing or 
appropriation, relative to boards without independent directors. We then turn to examine 
which firms with independent directors will be more likely to internalize or activate their 
independent role, which is mostly enacted through monitoring, to deter blockholder 
appropriation.   
We find that the presence of independent directors is associated with a reduction of 
blockholder appropriation, and that this is more accentuated in SOEs than in private firms. 
We attribute the difference in the influence of independent directors across ownership types 
to SOEs going through a much more thorough selection process in the nomination of their 
independent directors, and to the deliberate effort to curtail corruption. As such independent 
directors may be aiming to progress within the state career ladder, they may also be more 
motivated to gain recognition by the government for producing good results. 
In the second part of our study, we explore how the exposure of these EEMM firms to 
Anglo-American corporate governance practices might activate or make these independent 
directors pursue their monitoring role or influence in extenuating blockholder appropriation. 
We analyze the exposure to three international governance contingencies. First, independent 
directors create a positive effect on investment in MNEs. Second, our results indicate that 
independent directors in firms listed on foreign stock exchanges have a positive effect on 
investment and are likely to reduce blockholder appropriation. Third, we also find that 
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foreign independent directors are effective in monitoring the allocation of resources to 
investment.  
Our main conceptual contributions are to the growing literature on how corporate 
governance practices travel around the world, and its unintended consequences. We focus on 
whether the role of the independent director is activated depending on their alignment with 
majority blockholders or minority shareholders and the different outcomes on blockholder 
appropriation. That is, if independent directors align with the majority blockholder, we do not 
expect to see a decrease in blockholder appropriation. Conversely, if independent directors 
seek to benefit minority shareholders or comply with foreign regulation, we might observe 
some mitigation in blockholder appropriation. Thus, we extend the boundary conditions of 
the multiple agency perspective regarding the influence of types of ownership on the effects 
of independent directors in different institutional contexts from Western IPO contexts 
(Arthurs et al., 2008; Bruton et al., 2010) to the case of a different class of owners in the 
emerging markets context of Russia. This analysis of the role of independent directors in 
relation to different types of owners can be further tested in South East Asian contexts where 
large blockholders are founding family members (Filatotchev et al., 2005; Filatotchev et al., 
2011; Miller et al., 2009; Yoshikawa et al., 2010), or in Western contexts involving different 
blockholders representing institutions (Deutsch, 2005) or labor groups (e.g. in Germany 
boards often have labor or government representatives).  
Moreover, we contribute to the international corporate governance literature by 
exploring how the adoption of Anglo-American norms on boards ‘get lost in translation’ 
when adopted in developing countries. Anglo-American norms regarding the role of 
independent directors appear to get lost in translation in different ways depending on 
ownership types. On the one hand, the positive role of independent directors in SOEs in 
reducing appropriation seems to result from the translation of selection by nomination 
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committees related to the firm to influence of state involvement in the selection process. On 
the other hand, the role of independent directors in private firms is lost in translation as it is 
less effective in stemming misappropriation unless the private firms are more fully exposed 
to international influences by being MNEs, cross-listed or having foreign independent 
directors. Corporate governance structures in emerging economies often resemble those of 
developed economies in form but not in substance (Peng, 2004). We show that board 
structures designed to address principal-agent problems in developed economies are not 
always applicable to weak institutional contexts characterized by blockholder heterogeneity 
and principal-principal conflicts. Hence, while Anglo-American corporate governance 
practices might be a way to overcome some country of origin liabilities relating to weak 
institutions, this is limited because part of the institutional weaknesses relate to the ability of 
firms to interpret practices as it suits them. For example, while the corporate governance code 
specifies a certain level of independent directors (25%), our sample shows it is much lower 
on average (13.94%), with about half of boards composed of insiders only. 
After almost three decades of the fall of the Berlin Wall, progress towards 
strengthening the institutional environment remains slow (Hoskisson, et al., 2013). As such, 
our findings indicate that Russian MNEs may be able to overcome some of their institutional 
weaknesses by cross-listing in Anglo-American markets and bonding with the stronger 
institutions in these markets. Similarly, foreign directors as individual agents might also 
bridge these institutional differences towards some governance convergence and 
effectiveness.   
We also shed light into contextual research on state capitalism (Megginson, 2017; 
Wood et al., 2015), by showing that despite common belief, independent boards of state-
controlled entities are an efficient mechanism to combat funds misallocation. Specifically, we 
contribute textured analysis of multiple factors into corporate governance in EEMM and 
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Russia, especially to the literature on ownership (Chernykh, 2008; Durnev et al., 2005; 
Iwasaki et al., 2017), corporate disclosure and transparency (Berezinets et al., 2017; Black et 
al., 2016), and boards (Muravyev, 2017; Muravyev et al., 2014), by providing the first study 
with both conceptual and empirical insights on the role of independent directors in Russia 
using longitudinal data. 
This study has limitations that open up opportunities for further research. First, our 
focus is on Russia, which questions to what extent we can generalize the analysis to other 
EEMM. In many ways, governance mechanisms in Russia resemble most of those in China, 
especially when it comes to state influence. In China, the government appoints, party officials 
to top management and board positions in SOEs, which aligns officials’ career incentives 
with party priorities: if they succeed, they move up in the party. Officials loyal to the party 
compete to become top performers, motivated by possible promotion (Leutert, 2016).  
Comparative study of such similarities and differences of the impact of board mechanisms in 
China and Russia would be a promising avenue for future research. Second, while we 
highlight the influence of ownership structure on board independence, we do not discuss 
other board functions. Future research could explore how other board characteristics, such as 
board remuneration, are contingent on firm ownership. Third, blockholder appropriation 
could be measured differently, as we have indicated in the robustness tests section, such as 
the effect of independent directors on the possibility of blockholder appropriation by the 
likelihood of a firm being part of a business group, or the effect of reporting quality on the 
investment of firms with higher likelihood of under-investing. Other measures of blockholder 
appropriation could relate to M&A control premiums, related party transactions or percentage 
of non-trade accruals which we could not explore due to such data unavailability in Russia. 
Finally, further research could attempt to disentangle the effect of efficient boards from the 
effect of signaling of appointing independent (foreign) directors. We have explored the 
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signaling effect by accounting for the interaction effect with external finance as discussed in 
the robustness tests but other approaches using instrumental variables (Cerulli, 2015) may be 
possible.  
Our findings have some relevant implications for policymakers and, in particular, for 
corporate governance reforms. Policy making should progress to a more context-dependent 
understanding of corporate governance. Regulation focusing only on applying Anglo-
American practices to board independence may not be sufficient since board monitoring and 
other roles depend on ownership and listing characteristics which are morphed by an Eastern 
institutional context.  
In sum, we begin with the puzzle of how a prototypical Anglo-American practice such 
as the adoption of independent boards can help mitigate one of the most systemic governance 
challenges in EEMM firms, which is, the disconnect between the generation of cash flows 
and firm investments. We show that under the certain governance firm context (type of 
blockholders and further exposure to international governance practices), independent 
directors can be effective in mitigating blockholder appropriation, even in a country with a 
weak institutional environment such as Russia. This study is able to show when governance 
practices get properly translated across borders.  
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FIGURE 1  
Organizing Framework  
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FIGURE 2  
The figure plots the interactive effect of the proportion of independent directors on the relationship 
between investment and gross-cash flow (GCF) based on the estimated effects reported in the results 
Table III, models (1)-(2). 
 
(a) Fixed Effects      (b) GMM 
   
 
FIGURE 3 
The figure plots the interactive effect of the proportion of independent directors on the relationship 
between investment and gross-cash flow (GCF) for the sub-sample of privately owned firms based on 
the estimated effects reported in the results table IV, models (1) and (3). 
a) Fixed Effects     (b) GMM 
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TABLE 1  
Descriptive Statistics, EUR million  
 
Variable Obs. Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
        
Investment (ln) 218 0.2917 0.2678 0.6632 -1.9947 3.6051 
GCF (ln) 218 0.1873 0.1824 0.6429 -2.3219 2.3718 
LT Debt (ln) 218 5.1096 6.8806 4.1829 0.0000 12.2377 
Equity (ln) 218 2.9588 0.0000 4.0493 0.0000 12.6002 
Tobin's Q 167 0.9698 0.7246 0.9707 0.0010 7.6877 
ID (%) 218 0.1394 0.1000 0.1693 0.0000 0.6200 
FID (%) 218 0.0768 0.0000 0.1447 0.0000 0.5400 
Independent Director (1/0) 218 0.5092 1.0000 0.5011 0.0000 1.0000 
Institutional Blockholder (1/0) 218 0.0367 0.0000 0.1885 0.0000 1.0000 
Private Blockholder (1/0) 218 0.5000 0.5000 0.5012 0.0000 1.0000 
State Blockholder (1/0) 218 0.4633 0.0000 0.4998 0.0000 1.0000 
Cross-Listing (1/0) 218 0.4495 0.0000 0.4986 0.0000 1.0000 
MNE (1/0) 218 0.4220 0.0000 0.4950 0.0000 1.0000 
       
Note: Blockholder is defined as having absolute control of >=50%   
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TABLE 2 
Pairwise correlations  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
              
1. Investment (ln) 1.0000            
              
2. GCF (ln) 0.1290 1.0000           
  0.0572            
              
3. LT Debt (ln) 0.1228 0.0418 1.0000          
  0.0704 0.5394           
              
4. Equity (ln) 0.1437 0.0851 -0.1421 1.0000         
  0.0340 0.2105 0.0361          
              
5. Tobin's Q 0.2197 0.0900 -0.0519 -0.0628 1.0000        
  0.0043 0.2474 0.5057 0.4205         
              
6. ID (%) -0.0762 -0.0312 0.2772 0.0667 -0.0707 1.0000       
  0.2629 0.6467 0.0000 0.3268 0.3642        
              
7. FID (%) 0.0244 -0.0331 0.3471 0.0340 0.0245 0.7381 1.0000      
  0.7196 0.6266 0.0000 0.6179 0.7533 0.0000       
              
8. Institut. Blockholder (1/0) -0.0814 0.0120 -0.1688 0.0161 -0.0235 0.0006 -0.1038 1.0000     
  0.2311 0.8600 0.0126 0.8126 0.7632 0.9925 0.1266      
              
9. Private Blockholder (1/0) -0.0408 0.0609 0.1575 0.0672 0.2255 0.3830 0.4987 -0.1952 1.0000    
  0.5492 0.3710 0.0200 0.3231 0.0034 0.0000 0.0000 0.0038     
              
10. State Blockholder (1/0) 0.0716 -0.0656 -0.0943 -0.0735 -0.2145 -0.3843 -0.4609 -0.1813 -0.9291 1.0000   
  0.2926 0.3352 0.1654 0.2800 0.0054 0.0000 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000    
              
11. Cross-Listing (1/0) 0.0477 -0.0004 0.1611 -0.0639 0.1247 0.2640 0.3655 -0.1764 0.2951 -0.2294 1.0000  
  0.4833 0.9952 0.0173 0.3478 0.1083 0.0001 0.0000 0.0091 0.0000 0.0006   
              
12. MNE (1/0) -0.0047 -0.0755 0.1625 -0.0245 -0.0066 0.3988 0.5631 0.2284 0.2415 -0.3283 0.5161 1.0000 
  0.9450 0.2673 0.0163 0.7187 0.9328 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000               
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TABLE 3 
The moderating effect of independent directors on investment 
  (1) (2) 
 
Fixed 
Effects GMM 
VARIABLES 
Investment, 
in first diff 
Investment, 
in levels 
GCF -0.14 -0.04 
 (0.10) (0.09) 
GCF*ID Proportion 0.84* 0.36* 
 (0.32) (0.18) 
ID Proportion -1.47 -3.51* 
 (1.90) (1.73) 
Investment, lagged 0.06 0.94*** 
 (0.06) (0.11) 
Debt 0.03* 0.02+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Equity 0.03+ 0.02+ 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
Tobin's Q 0.22* 0.10 
 (0.10) (0.07) 
Observations 156 206 
R-squared 0.328  
Number of firms 41 44 
Wald Test for joint significance, p-value 0.0097 0.0552 
Number of instruments n.a. 16 
AR(1) n.a. -1.956 
P-Value AR(1) n.a. 0.0505 
AR(2) n.a. -1.492 
P-Value AR(2) n.a. 0.136 
Hansen n.a. 5.04 
P-Value Hansen n.a. 0.0256 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. Year dummies 
included but not reported for brevity. All continuous variables are in natural logarithms, except Tobin’s Q. 
ID proportion represents the number of independent directors relative to total board size.  Wald test is for 
the joint significance of GCF and GCF*ID coefficients. In the Fixed Effects (FE) specification, we compute 
investment and GCF in first differences of logarithms, e.g. the dependent variable is log⁡(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡) −
log⁡(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1).⁡ For the GMM specification, Investment and GCF variables have to be entered in 
levels (e.g. the dependent variable is log⁡(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡)). For model (2), we use xtabond2 command 
(Roodman, 2009), with delimited lags (2 3), collapsed instruments, and small sample correction. We 
instrument the lagged dependent variable. Number of instruments does not exceed the number of panel 
members. The Hansen’s  J statistic of instrument exogeneity is low, robust, but may be weakened by many 
instruments.  Arellano-Bond test statistic indicative of no second or higher order auto-correlation of residuals 
AR(2) is not significant, consistent with Arellano-Bond approach, and does not provide evidence of 
misspecification.  
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TABLE 4 
The moderating effect of independent directors on investment in private firms and SOEs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 H1a H1a H1a H1a H1b H1b H1b H1b 
 FE FE GMM GMM FE FE GMM GMM 
GCF -0.72+ -0.04 -0.06 -0.12     
 (0.37) (0.12) (0.14) (0.16)     
GCF*ID Proportion 2.64* 0.68 0.86+ 0.67     
 (1.10) (0.54) (0.47) (0.60)     
ID Proportion -12.05** -0.60 -8.36+ -6.61     
 (3.67) (0.53) (4.90) (6.43)     
GCF*foreign*indep.     1.15** 1.38** 0.69*** 0.48*** 
     (0.38) (0.39) (0.09) (0.09) 
GCF*foreign*insider       0.52*** 0.00 
       (0.09) (0.00) 
GCF*state*indep.     0.46+ 0.46* 0.72*** 0.52*** 
     (0.24) (0.18) (0.10) (0.10) 
GCF*state*insider     -0.02 -0.18+ 0.70*** 0.49*** 
     (0.14) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) 
GCF*private*indep.     0.19+ 0.07 0.71*** 0.51*** 
     (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) 
GCF*private*insider     0.07 -0.59 0.68*** 0.44*** 
     (0.14) (0.51) (0.09) (0.08) 
Investment, lagged 0.02 -0.14 0.41* 0.03 -0.05 0.07 -0.03 0.20*** 
 (0.16) (0.11) (0.17) (0.48) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.05) 
Debt 0.07** 0.01 0.02* 0.03+ 0.03* 0.05** 0.05** 0.03* 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Equity 0.03 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.02* 0.03+ 0.02* 0.03** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin's Q 0.45***   0.26  0.18  0.11 
 (0.11)   (0.16)  (0.18)  (0.07) 
Observations 74 156 156 78 218 139 265 182 
R-squared 0.549 0.260   0.242 0.377   
Number of firms 23 28 28 24 46 38 49 42 
Wald Test for Joint Significance 0.0184 0.1506 0.0446 0.278 0.0057 0.0006 1.42e-09 0.000 
Number of instruments   16 16   22 22 
AR(1)   -2.175 -0.0854   -0.146 -1.762 
P-Value AR(1)   0.0296 0.932   0.884 0.0780 
AR(2)   -1.669 -0.551   -1.525 -1.007 
P-Value AR(2)   0.0951 0.581   0.127 0.314 
Hansen   0.0286 2.187   8.989 10.37 
Hansen p-value   just identified just identified   0.0112 0.00128 
Note: Please refer to notes under Table 3.          
50 
 
 
TABLE 5 
The moderating effects of independent directors in MNEs, cross-listed firms, and of 
foreign independent directors  
 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 H2 H2 H3 H3 H4 H4 
 FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM 
              
GCF -0.18* -0.18 -0.36** -0.11 -0.06 -0.12 
 (0.08) (0.18) (0.11) (0.23) (0.10) (0.17) 
GCF*ID Proportion 1.10* 1.27* 2.08** 1.14+   
 (0.47) (0.54) (0.68) (0.65)   
GCF*FID Proportion     0.82** 1.07* 
     (0.30) (0.50) 
ID Proportion -1.63 -13.04* -6.12** -11.96   
 (2.64) (5.83) (1.94) (7.04)   
FID Proportion     18.55*** -10.90* 
     (1.16) (5.39) 
Investment, lagged 0.04 0.46* 0.32** 0.52* 0.09 0.59** 
 (0.24) (0.19) (0.10) (0.24) (0.05) (0.18) 
Debt 0.04 0.02+ 0.06* 0.02 0.02* 0.03* 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Equity 0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Tobin's Q 0.25  0.61**  0.15+  
 (0.22)  (0.20)  (0.09)  
       
Observations 55 114 57 107 156 284 
R-squared 0.352  0.543  0.394  
Wald Test for Joint Significance 0.0471 0.0562 0.0107 0.161 0.0014 0.0464 
Number of firms 15 17 16 19 41 49 
Number of instruments  16  16  16 
AR(1)  -1.559  -1.774  -1.956 
P-Value AR(1)  0.119  0.0760  0.0505 
AR(2)  0.726  -0.486  -1.492 
P-Value AR(2)  0.468  0.627  0.136 
Hansen  3.280  4.125  0.0256 
P-Value Hansen   just identified   just identified   just identified 
Note: Please refer to notes under Table 3.      
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TABLE 6 
Business Groups and Independent Directors 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Bus. Group 
(2) 
Bus. Group 
(3) 
Bus. Group 
(4) 
Bus. Group 
Independent directors (Y/N)  -0.40  -0.74* 
  (0.32)  (0.37) 
Independent Directors Proportion -2.54*  -3.34*  
 (1.29)  (1.57)  
Size (Sales) 1.31*** 0.56** 1.44*** 0.61** 
 (0.32) (0.17) (0.42) (0.20) 
Debt   -0.07 -0.01 
  
 (0.05) (0.04) 
Equity   0.17*** 0.12** 
  
 (0.05) (0.04) 
GIC Industries = 101020 -1.41* 0.68 -1.06 1.13+ 
 (0.63) (0.58) (0.83) (0.66) 
GIC Industries = 151010 3.44*** 3.17*** 4.79*** 3.92*** 
 (0.91) (0.70) (1.19) (0.82) 
GIC Industries = 151040 0.96 1.90** 1.87* 2.42*** 
 (0.60) (0.63) (0.78) (0.73) 
GIC Industries = 301010 2.94** 2.07** 3.35** 2.34** 
 (0.94) (0.75) (1.05) (0.86) 
GIC Industries = 501010 1.49+ 0.97 2.36* 1.30+ 
 (0.81) (0.63) (1.01) (0.73) 
Constant -14.72*** -7.89*** -17.50*** -9.38*** 
 (3.55) (1.84) (4.67) (2.20) 
     
Observations 282 389 244 335 
Notes: Robust standard errors in 
parentheses     
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + 
p<0.10     
Fixed effects. Year dummies included. 
Please refer to further notes under Table 3.     
     
 
